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“Sharing is caring” the old adage goes, with its implied message that both are morally desirable. But what
if it’s test answers that students are sharing with their friends? Integrating values, cheating, and in-group
bias theory, we hypothesize that adherence to group-loyalty benevolence values—considered as some of
the most moral values—positively predicts the acceptance of collective cheating, that is students cheating
together with in-group peers, when competition is salient. Operationalizing competition in three different
ways we test this in four studies. In Study 1, adherence to benevolence values predicted positive attitudes
toward collective but not individual cheating among students presented (vs. not) with a portrayal of
society as competitive. Study 2 revealed that, within the competitive context of an end-of-year exam,
adherence to benevolence values positively predicted moral disengagement toward collective cheating
but negatively predicted individual cheating. Study 3 showed that valuing both being a dependable friend
and attaining power and influence, predicted the acceptance of collective cheating. Finally, in Study 4,
carried out with dyads of students, groups composed of students who knew each other cheated more than
students composed of strangers. Furthermore, dyad adherence to power values positively predicted
cheating behavior among dyads that knew (vs. did not know) each other. These results signal that group
loyalty can, in certain conditions, lead to justifying and engaging in collective cheating, and that the
motivational underpinnings may be the moral status of benevolence values.
Educational Impact and Implications Statement
This research advances the argument that students who feel loyal to peers may reject individual
cheating, but have positive attitudes toward collective cheating and engage in collective cheating
behavior, in other words, group-based, cheating carried out with and for peers. This phenomenon
appears in contexts in which competition or the valuing of personal power is present and suggests that
we need to understand more about different types of cheating.
Keywords: values, collective cheating, benevolence, competition, moral disengagement
“Sharing is caring” the old adage goes, with its implied
message that both are morally desirable. But what if it’s test
answers that students are sharing? While the moral undesirabil-
ity of individual cheating is made crystal clear to most students,
when it comes to cheating with other students, the situation is
much more ambiguous. As one of 130 Harvard seniors facing
charges of cheating indignantly retorted “I was just someone
who shared notes, and now I’m implicated in this” (Pérez-Pena,
2012a). This incident highlights three key issues in education.
First, student cheating, defined as dishonest behavior enacted to
gain an advantage or depriving someone/others of something by
using unfair or deceitful methods (Oxford Dictionary, 2010), is
an academic reality. Research carried out by McCabe (2005)
with over 40,000 students on 68 U.S. and Canadian campuses
reveals that over 50% of students admit to having cheated.
Other studies carried out at university level indicate between
52% and 66% of students cheating (Bernardi et al., 2004;
Hrabak et al., 2004; Rettinger, Jordan, & Peschiera, 2004).
Second, cheating can take multiple forms and is not always an
individual activity. A number of cheating scandals involve
students engaging in collaborative dishonesty (Chapman &
Monahan, 2012; Finder, 2007; Pérez-Pena, 2012a). Third, as
academic group work is often encouraged in classrooms (Smith,
2006; Smith, Sheppard, Johnson, & Johnson, 2005), the line
between honest and dishonest collaboration is not clear (Pérez-
Pena, 2012a).
However, while many valuable insights have been gained into
motivates individuals to cheat on their own (Anderman, Griesinger,
& Westerfield, 1998; Anderman & Murdock, 2007), collective
cheating, defined as students cheating together with in-group
peers, is a form of cheating that has received relatively little
attention in the research world. Consequently, the aim of this
article is to explore collective cheating and identify who is likely
to engage in it and under what circumstances. Specifically, we
argue that loyalty to in-group members may, in certain contexts,
predict a greater acceptance of collective but not individual cheat-
ing as well as collective cheating behavior.
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A Motivational Approach to Cheating
Educational literature has established strong ties between cheat-
ing and both extrinsic motivation as well as achievement goals
(Murdock & Anderman, 2006). Van Yperen, Hamstra, and van der
Klauw (2011) showed the personal adoption of performance-
approach goals—achievement goals directed toward outperforming
others—in learning to be a predictor of cheating. In a study carried
out with middle school students, Anderman, Griesinger, and Wes-
terfield (1998) also revealed that self-report cheating behavior was
positively correlated with perceptions of classroom and
institutional-level performance-goal orientation. Results of a lon-
gitudinal study have shown that students transferring from less
performance-oriented middle school math classes to more
performance-oriented high school math classes admit to increases
in their cheating over the same period of time (Anderman &
Midgley, 2004). Experimental work (Murdock, Miller, & Goetz-
inger, 2007; Murdock, Miller, & Kohlhardt, 2004) also indicates a
relationship between performance-oriented classrooms and the
perceived justifiability of cheating. Furthermore, Anderman and
Murdock (2007) and Anderman and Danner (2008) have high-
lighted relationships between performance goals and cheating.
Performance goals, along with extrinsic motivation, in other
words desire for rewards and recognition (Anderman et al., 1998),
have been grouped under the umbrella of motivating forces driven
by external measures of achievement (Murdock & Anderman,
2006) and interest in external measures of achievement has been
associated with greater tendencies toward academic dishonesty
(Anderman et al., 1998; Anderman & Midgley, 2004; Murdock et
al., 2004; Murdock, Hale, & Weber, 2001; Toma & Butera, 2009).
This work is in line with studies that relate cheating to goals such
as the desire to improve or maintain grades and classroom standing
(Davis, Grover, Becker, & McGregor, 1992; Davy, Kincaid,
Smith, & Trawick, 2007; Franklyn-Stokes & Newstead, 1995;
Haines, Diekhoff, Labeff, & Clark, 1986; Newstead, Franklyn-
Stokes, & Armstead, 1996; Rettinger, Jordan, & Peschiera, 2004).
This overarching theme of motivating forces driven by external
measures of achievement brings us to the underlying importance of
individual values or higher-order goals in the understanding of
what motivates students to cheat. In the case of individual cheat-
ing, “self-enhancement” values, which are concerned with external
measures of achievement: success, wealth, influence and public
image (Schwartz, 2006) are relevant predictors of cheating atti-
tudes and behavior (Pulfrey & Butera, 2013).
Values: A Way to Understand the Underlying
Motivation to Cheat
Within the educational psychology literature, the term value is
commonly understood in terms of expectancy-value, notably the
individual’s beliefs about the degree to which they value an
activity and how well they will do in it (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000).
However, the term value may also be viewed more broadly as a
guiding principle in our lives. Values, with their role as guiding
principles in our lives, underlying individual decision-making,
attitudes, and behavior (Schwartz et al., 2012), are particularly
relevant to understanding unethical behavior. Indeed, the role of
individual values has been shown to relate to individual cheating
(Pulfrey & Butera, 2013) and that of institutional values has been
explored in relation to cheating at university (McCabe, Treviño, &
Butterfield, 1999). Values constitute higher order goals (Schwartz,
2006) developed through socialization, that underlie motivational
processes (Elliot, Chirkov, Kim, & Sheldon, 2001; Schwartz,
2006). These, in turn influence attitudinal and behavioral outcomes
(Chatzisarantis & Biddle, 1998; Deci & Ryan, 1987; Elliot, Shell,
Henry, & Maier, 2005; Harackiewicz, Barron, Tauer, & Elliot,
2002; Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002; Ryan & Deci, 2000). More
precisely, Schwartz (1992) defines individual-level values as cen-
tral goals that relate to all aspects of behavior and constitute a
source of motivation (Schwartz, 2006). In the abstract many things
may seem important to us, but we do not have the time or energy
to do them all and so we prioritize and make tradeoffs among
values (Schwartz, 2006) as we choose how to act.
Schwartz (1992) proposes a circumplex model of 10 universal
individual-level values, categorized in four value types. Proximity
between values on the value “wheel” implies compatibility and
distance indicates potential conflict, which means that diagonally
opposed values will be antagonistic. The four value types include
self-enhancement, self-transcendence, openness to change, and
conservation. Self-enhancement values of achievement and power
are concerned with personal success attained through the demon-
stration of normative competence, success attained competing with
others and with control over resources and people, the concrete
result of competition. Self-enhancement values are positioned di-
agonally opposite to self-transcendence values of universalism and
benevolence, in which the wellbeing and interests of all others
(universalism) or those close to us, our “in-groups” (benevolence)
are prioritized.
Self-enhancing power and achievement values have been con-
sistently related to less socially adaptive behavior. As Kasser,
Cohn, Kanner, and Ryan, (2007) claim, the “winner takes all”
mentality, the promotion of self-interest and the attachment of
self-worth to a material success, leads to a tendency for people to
form exchange-based relationships and to objectify others, judging
them in terms of their potential usefulness. Further to this,
Schwartz (2006) found that power and achievement values were
negatively correlated with cooperation in a game context and
found that the same values were related to a high concern for self
and low concern for others. Other findings have linked material-
istic value endorsement to greater Machiavellianism (distrust, ego-
centricity, and propensity for interpersonal manipulation; McHo-
skey, 1999) and treating others in less caring ways (Kasser et al.,
2007). Specific to cheating, Pulfrey and Butera (2013) have found
robust associations between self-enhancement value adherence
and individual student cheating. These results consolidate results
of studies showing that students whose higher order goals for
studying were to get a better job, earn more money and do better
professionally than others, reported significantly more types of
cheating behavior than students who studied for personal devel-
opment reasons (Davy et al., 2007; Newstead et al., 1996).
“Moral” Values: The Road to “Virtuous” Cheating?
Not surprisingly, self-transcendence values, which sit opposite
to self-enhancement values on the circumplex model, focusing as
they do on the wellbeing of others (Schwartz et al., 2012), are
generally considered to be highly moral values (Haidt, 2012;
Schwartz, 2007; Vauclair, 2009), implying that they focus on
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765GOOD CHEAT
actions that positively affect directly or indirectly the welfare of
others (Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1984). Results have also shown that
they negatively predict the acceptance of cheating in learning
contexts (Pulfrey & Butera, 2016). On an institutional level, Mc-
Cabe and Treviño (1993) provide evidence that the presence of
honor codes promoting self-transcendent values reduces cheating
by rendering it less normative.
However, self-transcendence values break down into two types
of morality: universal fairness (universalism values) promoting
wellbeing for all and “ingroup” loyalty and benevolence values
promoting wellbeing for close ones. The latter are particularly
relevant as classroom life is all about relationships. Friends usually
sit together in class and spend recreation time together and group
work is encouraged (Blatchford, Kutnick, Baines, & Galton,
2003).
Benevolence values encapsulate the prioritization of loyalty
toward one’s in-group. Moral foundations theory (Graham, Haidt,
& Nosek, 2009) champions the inclusion of loyalty as a form of
morality, asserting that in addition to the two classic moral dimen-
sions of care for others (Gilligan, 1982) and fairness or justice
(Kohlberg, 1976) there are up to four additional moral concerns for
humans, one of which, notably, is loyalty to one’s in-group. Values
research provides strong support for the inclusion of loyalty to and
concern for the in-group in the moral domain as in a study carried
out with 100 Israeli adults in 1995, Schwartz determined what lay
people considered to be moral values and found that 80% of his
sample considered benevolence values—defined as the preserva-
tion and nurturing of the well being of those with whom one is in
frequent contact, namely the in-group (Schwartz, 2007)—as the
most moral values. Similar results emanate from an international
research study carried out by Vauclair (2009) with 1,535 university
students. This reflects Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, and Eslinger’s
(2003) argument that moral emotions, by definition, relate primor-
dially to the welfare, cohesion, and order of the individual’s
in-group.
“You Scratch My Back and I Scratch Yours:” Benefits
of In-Group Loyalty
Peer groups play a significant role in the educational process.
The importance of in-group cooperation and loyalty is undeniably
emphasized in research showing the benefits of group work
(Baines, Blatchford, & Chowne, 2007; Johnson & Johnson, 1999),
team activities (Harrison & Narayan, 2003), group affiliations such
as sororities and fraternities (Pike, 2003), and the development of
solid, lasting friendships with other students (Wentzel, Barry, &
Caldwell, 2004) on student wellbeing and performance. In-group
cooperation seems indeed to be an adaptive mechanism aiding
academic survival for students today, just as evolutionary scientists
have argued that it was necessary for human survival in hunter-
gatherer societies (Boehm, 2012; Haidt, 2012; Wilson, 2012).
Why might this be? Apart from psychosocial benefits such as
the satisfaction of the need for belonging, which increases student
motivation and engagement (Osterman, 2000), group heuristics
theory (Jin & Yamagishi, 1997; Yamagishi, Jin, & Miller, 1998;
Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000; Yamagishi, Mifune, Liu, & Pauling,
2008) argues on that within an in-group people will tend to see a
norm of generalized reciprocity. In other words, people generally
act more cooperatively toward in-group members compared with
the out-group and there is more likely to be an in-group trust-based
norm of generalized reciprocity wherein favors rendered to group
members will be returned from the group, even if not necessarily
immediately from the same person.
In-Group Favoritism: The Dark Side of In-Group
Loyalty and Benevolence Values?
While the collective adaptive benefits of in-group loyalty and
cooperation are clear, is there a dark side to the adherence to
benevolence values and, if so, how might this manifest in the
classroom? According to the vast literature on in-group favoritism,
this phenomenon is defined as the tendency to be more positive
(Allport, 1954) and helpful (Fu, Tarnita, Christakis, Wang, Rand,
& Nowak, 2012) to members of one’s own group than to those of
other groups. This tendency is especially likely to occur as soon as
any salient, value-laden basis for differentiation between an in-
group and an out-group can be discerned (Turner, 1975).
This preferential attitude and treatment of in-group fellows is
particularly relevant to benevolence values. Schwartz (2007)
teased out this question by means of a cross-cultural study, in
which he first analyzed the degree to which groups of participants
adhered to both benevolence and universalism values as opposed
to predominantly benevolence values. He then created an index of
moral inclusiveness, tapping into the degree to which people
considered that being honest and forgiving, supporting justice,
equality, and peace applied uniquely to those who are inside the
in-group boundary as opposed to all other beings regardless of
their social identities. Results showed that adherence to benevo-
lence values, but not universalism values, indeed related to a
discriminatory application of goodwill and good deeds to in-group
over out-group members, a form of “limited good will” intended
for in-group members alone. Following this logic, we argue that
adherence to benevolence values in particular should be associated
with greater prioritization of in-group well-being as opposed to the
well-being of others generally and that this may create the basis for
the justification of unethical pro-in-group behavior when certain
contextual features are salient.
The Intensifying Role of a Competitive Context
Although a certain degree of in-group bias has been shown to
occur even in the absence of a competitive social environment
(Brewer, 1979), perceived potential threat to the in-group or any of
its members from competition with external agents has been
shown to play a key role in the explanation of active in-group bias.
A host of studies has shown that it is in a context of competitive
reward structures that attitudes and behaviors that maximize rela-
tive gain for the in-group are most enhanced (e.g., Brewer &
Silver, 1978; Ryen & Kahn, 1975; Worchel, Andreoli, & Folger,
1977). This can extend to behavior that violates moral codes
(Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, &
Sherif, 1961; Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002).
In-Group Bias and Collective Cheating in the
Academic Context
Competition and inequality of resources are indisputably a cen-
tral issue in society today (Cook & Frank, 2010; Elliot, 2017) and
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766 PULFREY, DURUSSEL, AND BUTERA
this filters down to ever-increasing competition for places at top
universities (Charles, 2014; Hartocollis, 2016; Ivywise, 2017;
Pérez-Peña, 2014). Anderman, Maehr, and Midgley (1999), Elliot
and Moller (2003), Nordmo and Samara (2009), Pope (2003), and
Pulfrey, Buchs, and Butera (2011) argue also that competition
remains a fact of life in many classrooms and university settings
with the accompanying struggle for top grades (Deutsch, 1979;
Ryan & Weinstein, 2009). Even if teachers downplay competition
within their classroom, students grow up with an awareness of it as
a fact of life (Bahr, 2014) with parental pressure to succeed a
socially recognized phenomenon (Carey, 2014) and this can create
ambivalent attitudes toward friends in school. As Pope (2003, p.
39) documented in her case-based research in a Palo-Alto high
school “students are often forced to choose between cheering on
their friends or plotting against them.” Research has documented
the impact of competitive values and competition-salience in the
environment on individual cheating (Anderman & Danner, 2008;
Pulfrey & Butera, 2013; Whitley, 1998), but to our knowledge no
research has directly addressed the question of collective cheating
in a classroom context.
In laboratory studies, Weisel and Shalvi (2015) recently showed
that individuals in dyads lie more about results of their individual
die rolls when incentivized with team payoffs for certain team-
level results. Hildreth, Gino, and Bazerman (2016) found that
loyalty positively predicted individual cheating on behalf of the
in-group when competition was high. In these studies, unethical
acts are carried out by individuals on behalf either of status-driven
real-life groups such as fraternities or else of experimentally cre-
ated groups of individuals who did not previously know each
other. Furthermore, both studies focus on an individual who is
cheating in private in a situation of anonymity. As Weisel and
Shalvi (2015) argue, this accurately captures the dynamics of some
real-life situations in which individuals can act unethically without
being identified.
But what about situations when peers cheat together? Sharing
exam answers or copying off other students, passing on exam
questions, copying a friend’s report and having a friend do one’s
work for one are all real-life examples of what we term “collective
cheating,” in which individuals, in this case peers at school,
actively collude with other members of the in-group with the aim
of improving the results of in-group members relative to the
out-group. We posit that such collective cheating is a potential way
to rationalize the seeming paradox between being loyal to peers
and succeeding. As such those who value peers and being loyal to
them will be able to justify collective cheating but not individual
cheating.
Hypothesis and Overview
More precisely, we hypothesize that, when competition is sa-
lient in one form or another, loyalty to peers will positively predict
positive attitudes toward collective forms of cheating. Different
forms of competition may be salient in students’ psyches: societal
level competition for jobs and wealth, grades-based competition
for top colleges or cum laude GPAs in exams or classwork, and
internalized values that promote a competitive approach to life,
namely power values of wealth, public image, control over people,
and resources (Schwartz et al., 2012). We examine our core
hypothesis in the light of these different forms of competition.
In Study 1 we experimentally manipulate student awareness of
a competitive society by evoking the portrayal of a relatively more
competitive versus more cooperative societal context, in other
words a free-market society in which competition for success is
central, versus a society characterized by greater solidarity and
support among people. We reanalyze data that showed that relative
adherence to self-transcendence values in general (benevolence
and universalism) negatively predicts cheating in general (both
individual and collective acts of cheating; see Pulfrey & Butera,
2016). In Study 1, we tease apart this result by splitting self-
transcendence values and cheating attitudes into their component
parts making it possible to test the specific association of relative
adherence to benevolence (promoting in-group wellbeing) as op-
posed to universalism (promoting well-being of all others and
nature) values with attitudes toward collective and individual
cheating.
In Study 2 we evoke the GPA/grades-based type of competition
as a contextual constant, using vignettes set in the context of an
end of year university exam. Here we test whether relative adher-
ence to benevolence values predicts moral disengagement toward
collective cheating but not individual cheating.
As individual values are internalized through socialization
(Schwartz, 2006), they are a valuable indicator of societal forces as
learnt by children and young people, constituting a real lynchpin
between social ideology and individual motivation. Study 3 fo-
cuses on this aspect of competition as a value system. Here we
examined trait-level orientations toward in-group loyalty and com-
petition testing the relation between simultaneous adherence to
loyalty-related benevolence values and instrumental, competition-
oriented, power-oriented values, and positive attitudes toward col-
lective cheating. We hypothesized that the valuing of both loyalty
and power (wealth, control over resources and people), would
predict collective cheating.
Finally, Study 4 takes a behavioral approach, measuring the
relation between working with someone you know and have points
in common with versus working with a stranger on actual group-
cheating behavior. We operationalize loyalty experimentally, com-
paring groups composed of students who know each other and
perceive themselves to be similar to groups composed of strangers.
In this study, as in Study 3, we assess the degree of chronic
competitive orientation in groups by measuring individual-
adherence to power values. We hypothesize that groups composed
of members who know each other and whose common interests are
rendered salient, will be more likely to cheat than groups com-
posed of strangers who perceive themselves as having nothing in
common, and that this effect will be particularly strong when the
groups are composed of members who value power.
Study 1
The aim of Study 1 was to test the impact of exposure to the
portrayal of a macrosocietal context of competition in interaction
with in-group loyalty benevolence-value adherence on attitudes
toward collective cheating. We predicted an interaction effect
between benevolence value adherence and societal context, with
benevolence value adherence predicting acceptance of collective
cheating in the condition in which a competitive societal context
was portrayed but not in a control condition. We also tested the
relation between universalism values and collective cheating and
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767GOOD CHEAT
benevolence values and individual cheating to ascertain whether
the predicted effect is specific to the benevolence-collective cheat-
ing relationship.
Method
Participants. One-hundred and 22 third-year students attend-
ing an international management school based in Switzerland,
participated in this Study. The sample thus consisted of 46 male
and 74 female students, with two missing values, with a mean age
of 22.02 (SD  1.73). The experiment was carried out in the
economics class by a visiting researcher. As in all four studies,
students were invited to participate in the study but also given the
opportunity to get on with something else if they did not wish to
take part. If any students did not take part, they were not included
in the sample. The sample used in Study 1 is the same as that used
in Study 2 of Pulfrey and Butera (2016). The interest of working
with this sample is that in the original study the authors collapsed
items of both benevolence and universalism values to measure the
higher-order value of self-transcendence. In the present reanalysis
we have separated universalism from benevolence (see Schwartz,
2007a). Moreover, their scale of acceptance of cheating included
examples of both individual and collective behaviors, which can
now be analyzed separately.
Procedure. Students filled in an individual values survey
measuring their relative adherence to benevolence values (see
below). Following this they were exposed to one of three experi-
mental conditions. In two conditions, participants were instructed
to read an extract from a lecture ostensibly given by a Nobel prize
winner in Economic Sciences to business school students on the
subject of the society they would shortly be entering (see Appen-
dix A for text). Although the structure of both speeches was
identical, in the competitive condition characteristics of society
were drawn from peer-reviewed texts presenting a free-market
ideology, policies, and structures (Beck, 1999; Clarke, 2004; Er-
icson, Barry, & Doyle, 2000; Larner, 2000; Larner & Craig, 2005;
Rose, 1993). In the cooperative society condition, characteristics
of society were drawn from the Giacalone and Thompson (2006)
“human centered worldview” (HWV), characterized as an econ-
omy that goes beyond money, embracing physical as well as social
wellbeing as necessary economic and business goals. A third
control condition did not present any experimental manipulation
(no text) in order to be sure not to render salient any other values
which might have incidentally impacted the outcome variable.
After the texts in the two experimental conditions, participants
were asked to put down three words or phrases to describe the
society they had just read about. The aim of this control question
was to assure that participants had actually read the texts. Twenty-
one participants who put no words down at all and one participant
who noted a totally inappropriate and irrelevant comment were
excluded from the main analyses, leaving 100 participants who
wrote down appropriate words, 31 in the competitive society
condition, 31 in the cooperative society condition, and 38 in the
control condition.
Following the experimental manipulation was a three-item scale
of acceptance of cheating involving other in-group members (col-
lective cheating) and a five-item scale of acceptance of individual
acts of cheating (individual cheating; see below).
Values. The students’ individual values were measured using
an adapted version (Pulfrey & Butera, 2013; Pulfrey & Butera,
2016) of the Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire items
(Schwartz et al., 2001) in which, for reasons of space, the ques-
tions addressed the respondent directly as opposed to asking the
respondent to compare themselves to another person, and included
33 of the original 40 questions. The questionnaire included scales
of items for the four higher-order value types: self-enhancement
(six items: e.g., “It is important to me to be successful;”   .69);
self-transcendence divided into: universalism (five items: e.g., “It
is important to me that every person in the world is treated
equally;”   .73); and benevolence (three items: “It is important
to me to help the people around me,” “. . . to be loyal to my
friends,” “. . . to respond to the needs of others;”   .67); open
to change (nine items: e.g., “It is important to me to think up new
ideas and be creative;”   .76); conservation (10 items: e.g., “It
is important to me to follow rules and do what one is told;”  
.67). The answer scale ranged from 1 (not at all important) to 7
(very important).
Schwartz (1992) individual values theory orders values in a
circumplex model that captures the congruence or conflict between
different values. If one values self-direction, one is not likely to
value conformity and obedience and these values feature on op-
posite sides of the circumplex. The way that individuals trade off
one value against another is the guiding force in attitude formation
and behavior and individuals differ in their use of the response
scales, some rating everything high and others sticking in the
middle; thus, it is necessary to correct individual differences in the
response scale in order to capture value priorities (Schwartz,
2006). Consequently, we calculated each individual’s overall av-
erage score for all values and then subtracted this mean value score
from their score on benevolence values (relative benevolence 
raw score benevolence-individual mean score for all values), thus
creating a score of benevolence relative to other values (as rec-
ommended by Schwartz, 2006). The resulting individual score was
used in the regression models. Hedonism values were included
with the open to change value type.
Acceptance of cheating scales. In the questionnaire used by
Pulfrey and Butera (2016), a range of items associated with aca-
demic dishonesty was created. In the present reanalysis, initial
exploratory factor analysis using Direct Oblimin rotation was used
to discard items that had multiple loadings or no high loadings on
any one factor. This left two factors with eigenvalues over 1. The
first factor included five acceptance of individual cheating items
(  .91) and explained 52% of the variance. The second factor
included three acceptance of collective cheating items (  .77)
and explained a further 20.76% of the variance. The factor analysis
breakdown is presented in Table 1 and descriptive statistics in
Table 2.
A confirmatory factor analysis of the two cheating scales re-
vealed a good model fit, 2  29.90, ns, 2/df  1.57, RMSEA 
0.07, CFI  0.98, SRMR  0.05, and one of the entire measure-
ment model, namely the two cheating scales and the two values
scales, universalism and benevolence, equally revealed good
model fit, 2  137.75, p  .001, 2/df  1.41, RMSEA  0.06,
CFI  0.95, SRMR  0.07). We did not have problems with
abnormal distributions.
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Results
To test the hypothesis that the relationship between benevolence
and collective cheating will be especially positive in a competitive
environment, we ran dummy-coded regression analyses with the
control condition as the reference condition, coded 0. The model
therefore included two contrasts—the competitive contrast (control
Condition 0, competitive Condition 1, cooperative Condition 0),
and the cooperative contrast (control condition 0, competitive
condition 0, cooperative Condition 1)—relative benevolence value
adherence and interactions between the contrasts and benevolence
values. Preliminary regression analyses run with all the terms of
the model revealed the presence of one outlier (studentized deleted
residual  2.73) and so this case was removed from the main
analyses leaving a total of 99 participants. Results revealed no
main effects of condition or of relative benevolence value adher-
ence on acceptance of collective cheating, but the predicted inter-
action effect between adherence to benevolence values and con-
trast one, the competitive contrast, was significant, B  1.52, F(1,
94)  7.51, p  .008, 2  .05, 95% CI [0.53, 2.50]. No other
effects in the model were significant.
Examination of the interaction effect revealed that adherence to
benevolence values positively predicted positive attitudes toward
acts of collective cheating in the competitive society condition,
B  1.12, F(1, 94)  9.18, p  .003, 2  0.24, 95% CI [0.41,
1.82]. but not in the control condition, B  0.40, F(1,
94)  0.87, ns, 95% CI [1.13, 0.33] or the cooperative con-
dition, B  0.46, F(1, 94)  0.86, ns, 95% CI [0.42, 1.35].
To test whether the relationship between benevolence and col-
lective cheating was unique, we ran a second regression model
with relative universalism instead of benevolence values, which
revealed no significant effects, (interaction effect between adher-
ence to universalism values and contrast one, the competitive
contrast, B  0.90), F(1, 94)  3.13, ns. We also ran a third
regression model with benevolence value adherence as indepen-
dent variable and individual cheating as dependent variable. This
revealed no significant effects (interaction effect between adher-
ence to benevolence values and contrast one, the competitive
contrast, B  0.57), F(1, 94)  0.53, ns.
Discussion
Results revealed that an increase in relative adherence to benev-
olence values positively predicted attitudes toward collective
cheating in a context in which competitive societal practices and
values were promoted but not in a control condition. This effect
was not observed for the comparison between the control condition
and a context in which cooperative societal practices and values
were promoted. Nor was it observed for the relationship between
benevolence value adherence and attitudes toward individual
cheating. The relationship between universalism value adherence
and attitudes toward collective cheating was also nonsignificant in
all conditions. These results indicate that more positive attitudes
toward acts of collective cheating indeed seem to be above all
related to benevolence values, in a context in which a competitive
societal environment is salient.
Study 1 used the evocation of a relatively distal and macro
societal environment to render competition salient. This portrayal
of the external world might prime future career-related aspirations
in which the collective, in-group can play a significant part in the
development of a successful career (Tsui & Fahr, 1997). The fact
that the impact of the cooperative society representation on atti-
tudes toward collective cheating is situated between that of the
control condition and that of the competitive society with a simple
slope beta coefficient that is positive, although not significantly so
Table 1
Study 1 (N  122): Exploratory Factor Analysis—Acceptance of Individual and
Collective Cheating
Item: In my courses, I think it’s ok sometimes to:
Factor loadings
Factor 1
(Individual)
Factor 2
(Collective)
Put in a reference to an article without looking it up .87 .19
Get homework answers off the web without referencing them .88 .30
Copy some good material off the web without referencing .88 .30
Have someone else write a paper for me .85 .23
Resubmit a project that I’ve done before for another class .76 .38
Get test-related information off friends who took the test earlier in the day or week .30 .86
Share individual homework answers .38 .78
Get help on my assignments from family members or friends outside school .14 .81
Table 2
Study 1 (N  122): Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations Among Variables
Variables M SD Range (2) (3)
Benevolence values (relative) (1) .35 .59 1.39–1.82 .06 .03
Acceptance of collective cheating (2) 4.34 1.39 1.33–7.00 — .35
Acceptance of individual cheating (3) 2.62 1.30 1.00–7.00 — —
 p  .001.
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769GOOD CHEAT
and not significantly different from the control condition, might
support this argument.
Within the classroom context although practices may not focus
on competition, the bottom line of the GPA and the consequences
it holds, at high school level for accessing increasingly selective
top-level universities and at college level for recruitment for top-
level jobs, also imposes competitive pressure on students (Pulfrey,
Darnon, & Butera, 2013). This is particularly the case seeing that
however much groupwork may be organized in the classroom, the
majority of school and college evaluation is individual (Tyler et
al., 2008). Competition between students has consistently been
associated with explanations of individual cheating (Gallant &
Drinan, 2006; McCabe & Trevino, 2002; Murdock & Anderman,
2006). Consequently, in the following study, our first aim is to
focus on the question as to whether, within a proximal environ-
ment of individualistic competition, namely an end-of-year exam,
adherence to benevolence group-oriented values still positively
predicts positive attitudes toward collective forms of cheating.
Because in Study 1 attitudes toward cheating were measured,
which did not allow direct comparison between individual and
collective cheating, our second aim in Study 2 was to provide an
alternative way of measuring attitudes toward cheating. We ac-
complished this by creating a set of vignettes describing individual
versus collective forms of cheating and measuring the degree to
which participants engaged in a form of moral disengagement
toward them. The vignette approach has already been used in
research on individual cheating (Rettinger et al., 2004) and has the
advantage of capturing attitudes more indirectly as participants
judge the behavior of others. The behaviors portrayed in the
vignettes that we ask participants to assess, all directly violate the
basic rules of an individually based examination system in one
way or another. Thus, any degree of acceptance of them will
require moral justification, whereby ways are sought to reinterpret
specific behaviors as morally acceptable (Bandura, 2002), by
means of cognitive mechanisms to allay self-regulatory censure.
Moral disengagement theory (Bandura, 2002) offers a range of
cognitive techniques by which potential guilt may be assuaged
(Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011). Moral principles that are, in fact,
violated are thus perceived to be respected (Tsang, 2002).
Just as individual cheating has been shown to take a range of
forms (Pope, 2003), collective cheating might manifest itself in a
number of different ways and our third aim was to address this
little-explored question. In-group cooperation within the context of
an individual exam is likely to manifest itself in the form of
self-interested helping or reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), in
which the individual is motivated to work in collusion with other
in-group members for mutual benefit. We investigate three forms
that this might take: in-group-sharing of resources, individual
altruism in which one individual helps the rest of the group, and
in-group versus out-group stealing in which in-group members
copy off other students.
In-group resource-sharing constitutes real-time, in-group based
investment with immediate pay-off, manifested by in-group mem-
bers sharing their answers. Individual altruism or reciprocal altru-
ism is argued to constitute a staggered form of cooperation con-
sisting of time-one, in-group investment from an individual that is
accompanied by the potential expectation of time-two reciproca-
tion of some sort from the other group members (Axelrod &
Hamilton, 1981). This latter form of cooperation in the context of
an exam would be manifested by one group-member sharing
answers with the others. The third form of collective cheating,
namely in-group versus out-group stealing is particularly relevant
to the findings that relative adherence to benevolence values and
hence to a lesser extent their neighboring value universalism,
predicts bounded morality applicable to the in-group context
(Schwartz, 2007a). In Study 2, therefore, we aim to test the degree
to which relative benevolence-value adherence predicts moral dis-
engagement toward these three types of collective cheating in
comparison with individual cheating.
Study 2
Integrating the above questions, in Study 2 we test the hypoth-
esis that, within the individually competitive context of an end of
year selection exam, adherence to benevolence values will predict
moral disengagement for collective cheating (in-group resource
sharing, altruistic sharing, in-group vs. out-group copying) to a
greater extent than for individual cheating (individual copying for
individual gain).
Method
Participants. Eighty-two second- and third-year students in
the social sciences department of a French-speaking Swiss Uni-
versity, with a mean age of 21.89 (SD  2.52), participated in this
study. This sample consisted of 12 male and 69 female students,
with one missing value. The experiment was carried out in the
context of the students’ social psychology classes and included all
the students present the day of the administration.
Procedure. Students were asked if they would be willing to
complete two separate surveys. The aim of the first survey was to
find out their opinions about their lives and studies and the aim of
the second was to find out their opinions about the university
system and its norms. They were also told that we were particu-
larly interested in the views of second and third year students as
they had by now acquired a certain experience of university life.
All students in the class agreed to participate.
Participants then completed the two surveys, which were both
anonymous. Discrete coding, disguised as a patent number at the
bottom of the page, made it possible to link each individual’s two
surveys. The first survey consisted of the same values question-
naire as used in Study 1. The second survey featured one of four
possible vignettes, portraying individual cheating (N 22), group-
sharing (N 20), one student helping in-group members (altruistic
cheating; N  20) and in-group members copying off other (out-
group) students (collective copying; N  20). All the texts were
preceded by the following introduction: “The text below is a
personal account of Alex, a student at this university. Please read
the text.” The name Alex was chosen as it is a common unisex
name. The texts (English translation) are presented in full in
Appendix B and an example of the French version is presented in
Appendix C.
The vignettes were followed by a scale of moral disengagement
and opinions of the actions portrayed in the vignette, adapted from
Shu, Gino, and Bazerman (2011).
Measures.
Values. The same measure of values was used as in Study 1:
self-enhancement (  .72); self-transcendence divided into uni-
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770 PULFREY, DURUSSEL, AND BUTERA
versalism (  .72) and benevolence (  .60); open to change
(  .70); conservation (  .73). The relative benevolence score
was calculated as in Study 1.
Moral disengagement. The six items of the Shu et al. (2011)
scale were translated into French (e.g., “Sometimes getting ahead
of the curve is more important than adhering to rules,” “End results
are more important than the means by which one pursues them”),
and adapted to be applicable to the behavior of the student/s
described in the four vignettes: “Concerning the actions of Alex
(and of his/her friends).” The word “cheating” was removed from
the two questions that contained it to allow for unbiased participant
interpretation of the action in the vignettes. Six additional items
were added to the scale, for example “Sometimes it’s acceptable to
do this,” “It’s more or less normal,” to ensure that it captured the
participant’s express approval and rationalization of the acts being
described. An initial exploratory factor analysis with all 12 items
revealed that one of the Shu et al. (2011) scale items, namely “If
others engage in cheating behavior, then the behavior is morally
permissible” loaded negatively on the first main factor. A confir-
matory factor analysis carried out with just the six Shu et al. (2011)
items confirmed that this item did not load significantly on the
scale factor. Consequently, a second exploratory factor analysis
was run with the other 11 items (see Table 3). Results revealed a
first main factor that includes the other five Shu et al. (2011) items
as well as three of the additional items, explaining 42.56% of the
variance. To check on model fit for this factor, a confirmatory
factor analysis was run using structural equation modeling (Stata).
The initial model showed inadequate indices of fit. 2  54.21 ns
2/2  2.71, RMSEA  0.146, CFI  0.87, SRMR  0.06, ( 
.85). Removing one item, “It’s no big deal,” (modification index:
26.86), provided a seven-item scale with good fit, 2  18.22, ns
2/2  1.30, RMSEA  0.06, CFI  0.98, SRMR  0.04, ( 
.84.). Once again we ran a full SEM measurement model contain-
ing benevolence value and moral disengagement items. The model
showed excellent fit, 2  37.19 ns 2/2  1.09, RMSEA  0.03,
CFI  0.99, SRMR  0.06. We did not have problems with
outliers or abnormal distributions. Descriptive statistics appear in
Table 4.
Results
To test the hypothesis that within the context of a competitive
exam, benevolence value adherence will predict greater moral
disengagement toward collective than individual cheating, we ran
robust regression analyses, which automatically control for any
deviations from normality in the data. In a first set of analyses, we
created three orthogonal contrasts. The first contrast pitted the
individual cheating condition (coded 3) against the three collective
cheating conditions (coded 1). In the second contrast the indi-
vidual condition was coded 0, the group cheating off other students
was coded 2 and the two sharing conditions were coded1. In the
third contrast the individual condition and the group cheating off
other students were coded 0, the individual sharing with the group
was coded 1 and the group sharing was coded 1. The model thus
contained eight terms: relative benevolence value adherence, the
three contrasts, interactions between benevolence value adherence
and the three contrasts, and gender as a control variable, as a 2
test revealed a significantly higher number of female than male
participants, 2(82)  97.49, p  .001 (see Figure 1).
Results revealed a main effect of the first contrast (individual
cheating vs. collective cheating) with participants generally mor-
ally disengaging toward the individual cheating condition more
than the collective conditions, B  0.32, F(1, 76)  5.15, p  .03,
2  .08, 95% CI [0.04, 0.60]. However, there was also an
interaction between the first contrast and benevolence value ad-
herence, B  0.38, F(1, 76)  6.61, p  .01, 2  .10, 95% CI
[0.68, 0.09] showing that, consistent with our hypothesis, as
adherence to benevolence values increased so did moral disen-
gagement toward the three acts of collective relative to individual
cheating. Examination of simple effects revealed first that while
benevolence value adherence negatively but not significantly pre-
dicted moral disengagement in the individual cheating condition,
B  0.86, F(1, 76)  0.29, ns, 2  .12, 95% CI [1.99, 0.27],
it positively predicted it in the collective conditions, B 0.57, F(1,
76)  4.67, p  .05, 2  .08, 95% CI [0.04, 1.10]. There was a
main effect of gender, B  1.10, F(1, 76)  11.70, p  .001,
2  .11, 95% CI [1.76, 0.35] with men morally disengaging
more than women. No other effects were significant.
Supplementary analyses. In order to understand precisely
which of the collective conditions were driving these results and to
what extent condemnation of self-serving individual cheating was
differentiated from the other three in-group-serving conditions, we
carried out a second set of analyses using dummy coding to
compare each collective condition with the individual cheating
one. Gender was once again included in the model as was benev-
Table 3
Study 2 (N  82): Exploratory Factor Analysis for Extended Moral Disengagement Scale
Item: Concerning the actions of Alex (and of his/her friends): Factor 1 Factor 2
Sometimes getting ahead of the curve is more important than adhering to rules. .68 .40
End results are more important than the means by which one pursues them. .55 .14
Rules should be flexible enough to be adapted to different situations. .54 .08
It’s appropriate to seek short cuts as long as it’s not at someone else’s expense. .77 .17
Sometimes it’s acceptable to do this. .80 .16
It’s more or less normal. .63 .47
It doesn’t hurt anyone. .77 .16
Items not included in final scale.
When it comes to it, I can understand Alex/them. .46 .63
It’s not surprising. .07 .76
That’s how it is. .06 .76
It’s no big deal (ulterior CFA revealed covariance with “It doesn’t hurt anyone;”
MI  26.86). .76 .09
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771GOOD CHEAT
olence value adherence and the interactions between the three
contrasts and benevolence values, giving eight terms in all in the
regression model. Results indicated a main negative effect of the
contrast comparing Condition 2 (group collectively copying off
other people) with Condition 1 (individual copying off other
people), B  1.67, F(1, 76)  7.02, p  .01, 95% CI
[2.91, 0.41].
More interestingly, there was a also positive interaction effect
between the contrast opposing Condition 2 (group collectively
copying off other people) to Condition 1 (individual copying off
other people) and adherence to benevolence values, B 2.00, F(1,
78)  8.18, p  .006, 95% CI [0.59, 3.32], showing that benev-
olence value adherence tended to predict moral disengagement to
a greater extent for group collectively copying off other people
compared with individual copying off other people.
As in the first analyses, there was a main effect of gender,
B  1.10, F(1, 78)  8.94, p  .004, 2  .11, 95% CI
[1.76,0.35], with men morally disengaging more than women.
Results are presented in Figure 2.
Robustness check for interaction effect. Because Study 2
has a small sample size, we performed a robustness check to verify
that the interaction effect was not simply due to chance. To do this
we ran two Monte-Carlo simulations, which are very useful for
establishing the power of a test (Muthen & Muthen, 2002). The
first of these used normally distributed random variables for the
continuous predictors, and the continuous dependent variable; we
used the actual variables’ means and standard deviations as a basis
for the random generation process. We generated binomial vari-
ables for three dummy-coded contrasts used to compare the three
collective cheating conditions with the individual cheating condi-
tion, as well as gender, using the percentages from the real vari-
ables as a basis for the random generation process. In this way, we
were able to determine what the likelihood was to detect a signif-
icant interaction, where one does not exist in the population,
knowing that with increasing k predictors and a small n the
probability of detecting an interaction increases by chance alone
(see Jacquart & Antonakis, 2015). The second simulation was
based on the observed variance-covariance matrix of the data
analyzed in Study 2. We drew sample data (at n  82) from this
population matrix, assuming a multivariate normal distribution,
using Stata’s “drawnorm” command (to simulate different sam-
pling contexts). We then ran each simulation 5,000 times, gener-
ated the t-statistics for each of the terms in the model and used this
value to calculate the probability of detecting a significant inter-
action effect (see Antonakis & House, 2014, Study 4).
Results from the first Monte Carlo revealed that the interaction
of our relative adherence to benevolence values and each of the
three collective cheating contrasts in the random model had no
more than a 6% chance of producing a significant effect on the
dependent variable. However, from the second Monte Carlo sim-
ulation, in the actual model, the interaction of the dummy-coded
contrast, comparing Condition 2, (group copying off others) to
Condition 1 (individual cheating), and benevolence adherence,
showed an 83% chance of producing a significant result. Testing
the model with larger sample size would obviously increase the
probability of detecting a significant result across the three inter-
actions. Overall, these results indicate that the significant effect we
observe seems to be stable and not due to chance despite the
smallish sample size.
Discussion
Results of Study 2 revealed that in a context of individually
focused competition that students regularly face in their end of
year of exams, adherence to benevolence values positively pre-
dicted moral disengagement in the three collective cheating sce-
narios to a greater extent than in the vignette depicting individual
cheating. Further analyses specified that this difference between
collective and individual cheating was significant for group col-
lectively copying off other people, and marginal for both group
sharing answers and individual providing answers to in-group.
These results complement those of Study 1, showing that even
in a context of individual, immediate competition, adherence to
benevolence values seems indeed to go with the condoning of
collectively orchestrated pro-in-group cheating, particularly cheat-
ing that actively exploits out-group resources in order to benefit
the in-group. At the same time adherence to these same values
does not predict moral justification of acts of individual cheating,
once again supporting the clear distinction between these two
types of academic dishonesty. We also see a main effect of gender
with men morally disengaging toward cheating more than women,
an effect which replicates a number of other gender-cheating
related findings (Athanasou & Olasehinde, 2002).
Study 3
While in the first two studies we have worked with benevo-
lence values as a whole, Schwartz et al. (2012) have recently
Table 4
Study 2 (N  82): Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order
Correlations Among Variables
Variables M SD Range (2)
Benevolence values (relative) (1) .74 .49 .52–1.98 .02
Moral disengagement (2) 3.75 1.12 1.00–6.43 —
Figure 1. Study 1: Interaction between relative adherence to benevolence
values and portrayal of competitive versus cooperative society by Nobel
Economics Prize winner.
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772 PULFREY, DURUSSEL, AND BUTERA
identified two subtypes of benevolence value: (a) benevolence-
caring (helpful, working for others’ welfare, honest, forgiving),
a value type more related to family; and (b) benevolence-
dependability (being dependable, loyal to friends), a value-type
more related to friends. What type of benevolence is at the heart
of the acceptance of collective cheating? We would argue that,
in the context of the academic arena on which we have thus far
focused, benevolence dependability, with its strong focus on
in-group loyalty will be more relevant in predicting more pos-
itive attitudes to collective cheating carried out with friends
than caring benevolence, with its more generically moral char-
acteristics of helpfulness, honesty and charity. We address this
question in Study 3.
A second question addressed in Study 3 is that of the role of
competition as an internalized pressure that is instrumental for
getting what one desires. Thus far competition has featured as
a situational variable, a societal level variable manipulated in
Study 1 and an institutional-level variable, held constant in
Study 2. However, both types of competition are likely to put
pressure on students precisely because they pose a potential
threat to obtaining valuable goods and resources. Values are
internalized through socialization from key social agents such
as parents, peers, media and education (Schwartz, 2006). As
such, students are likely to have a generic adherence to certain
values via their upbringing. We argue that students who adhere
to power values, with their focus on “social status and prestige,
control or dominance over people and resources”(Schwartz et
al., 2012, p. 664), are likely to have a chronically competitive
view of life as access to these things inevitably implies a
competitive drive to outperform others. Furthermore, research
(Pulfrey & Butera, 2013) indicates that pure adherence to power
and achievement values relative to other values is a direct
predictor of individual cheating. So how might the individual
who both craves power but is at the same time strongly loyal to
their in-group behave?
Technically speaking, although power and benevolence val-
ues are theoretically positioned at opposite poles of the values
circumplex, recent research has highlighted the fact that benev-
olence values are generally centrally situated within the circle,
implying that they have a potentially universal quality
(Schwartz & Butenko, 2014). Indeed, Schwartz (2007b), in the
context of cultural differences in values, pointed out that the
U.S. population is positioned relatively high on power and
achievement values and correspondingly low on universalism
values, but not as low on benevolence values. Consequently, the
dual adherence to pro-in-group benevolence values and power
values, which may be upheld for the individual him or herself
and also for the group to which he or she belongs, is not
necessarily incompatible.
Thus, the dual aim of Study 3 is to add precision to the previous
two studies by pinpointing the type of benevolence associated with
collective cheating and to extend them by testing the impact of trait
competitiveness as portrayed by individual adherence to power
values. We hypothesize that the simultaneous adherence to both
benevolence-dependability (in-group loyalty) and power values
should be likely to predict collective cheating. However, this
should be less the case for adherence to benevolence-caring values.
Method
Participants. Three-hundred and 21 students in the social
sciences department of a French-speaking Swiss university, with a
mean age of 20.72 (SD  4.13), participated in this study. This
sample consisted of 67 male and 254 female students.
Procedure. The experiment was carried out in the context of
a first-year social psychology class. Students were invited to fill in
a paper and pencil survey. Participation was voluntary and all
students present that day accepted to participate. The values and
cheating questions formed part of a larger survey, destined to
Figure 2. Study 2: Interaction between relative adherence to benevolence values and vignette portrayal of four
different types of exam cheating.
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773GOOD CHEAT
validate a French version of Schwartz et al.’s (2012) refined values
questionnaire (Pulfrey, Schwartz, Crouzevialle, & Butera, 2017).
Measures.
Values. The French version of the new refined values survey
PVQ-R (Schwartz et al., 2012, validated by Pulfrey et al., 2017)
was used, including benevolence dependability (  .59), benev-
olence caring (  .76), and power (  .82). As we were testing
an interaction between two individually held values, we did not use
relative scores.
Acceptance of collective cheating. The same three-item scale
of acceptance of acts of collective cheating behavior was used as
in Study 1 (  .66).
Acceptance of individual cheating. The same five-item scale
of acceptance of acts of individual cheating behavior was used
as in Study 1 (  .88). Descriptive statistics are presented in
Table 5.
As the reliability for benevolence dependability was low and we
were interested in the potential structural validity of two value
types that normally sit on opposite sides of the Schwartz cir-
cumplex model (Schwartz, 1992), we examined the structural
relations between our three key variables of interest, entering the
items of benevolence-dependence and power values and accep-
tance of collective cheating in a multidimensional scaling analysis
using SPSS. Results revealed excellent fit, S-Stress, .002, D.A.F.,
1.00, Tucker’s Coefficient of Congruence, 1.00, with the items of
the respective variables closely clustered and the three variables
occupying distinct spaces in the diagram. We did not have prob-
lems with outliers.
Results
In order to test the assumption that simultaneous adherence to
both benevolence-dependability and power values would pre-
dict acceptance of collective cheating, we used raw score value-
adherence measures for the power and benevolence dimensions.
The basic regression model included 22 terms: adherence to
benevolence-dependability and benevolence-caring values, adher-
ence to power values, the interaction between power and
benevolence-dependability, the interaction between power and
benevolence-caring, the remaining 16 values and gender included
as a control variable. No variables needed to be omitted because of
collinearity. As the dependent variable, acceptance of collective
cheating, showed a left skew (M  5.30, SD  1.08), we used a
Stata general linear model with a family (Poisson) option and
robust standard error estimates for the regression analysis, (Stat-
alist, 2010; Stata User’s Guide, 2015).
Results of the model revealed the predicted interaction effect of
benevolence dependability and power, B  0.05, SE  .02, Z 
2.35, p  .02, 95% CI [0.01, 0.08], implying that as adherence to
benevolence dependability and to power both increase, so does
acceptance of acts of collective cheating. Examination of simple
slope effects showed that at high levels of power value adherence
(	1 SD), adherence to benevolence-dependability values posi-
tively predicted acceptance of collective cheating, B  0.06, SE 
.03, Z  2.46, p  .01, 95% CI [0.01, 0.12], but at low levels of
power value adherence (1 SD), the relationship between
benevolence-dependability and cheating acceptance was not sig-
nificant, B  0.03, SE  .03, Z  0.78, ns.
The interaction between benevolence caring and power was
not significant, B  0.00, SE  .02, Z  0.01, ns Additional
significant effects of values included adherence to conformity to
rules, which negatively predicted collective cheating acceptance,
B  0.04, SE  .01, Z  2.88, p  .004, 95% CI [0.07,
0.02], as did self-direction of thought, B  0.05, SE  .02,
Z2.62, p .01, 95% CI [0.09, 0.01]. Hedonism had a positive
effect, B 0.05, SE .02, Z 2.28, p .02, 95% CI [0.01, 0.09].
No other effects were significant.
In order to find out if this combination of benevolence-
dependability and power uniquely predicted acceptance of collec-
tive but not individual cheating, we also tested the model with
individual cheating as dependent variable. Results of the same
model using a link (log) function—as acceptance of individual
cheating showed a left skew, (M  2.54, SD  1.09)—showed no
significant effect of the combination of these two variables on
acceptance of individual cheating, B  0.04, SE  .03, Z  1.41,
ns, 95% CI [0.02, 0.10]. However, there was a significant main
effect of adherence to power values, B 0.08, SE .03, Z 2.25,
p  .02, 95% CI [0.01, 0.14] and an effect of gender on
individual cheating, with male participants showing higher levels
of acceptance of individual cheating, B  0.23, SE  .07,
Z  3.58, p  .001, CI [0.01, 0.14].
Discussion
These results show that combined adherence to power values
and benevolence-dependability values—with their focus on friend-
ship, loyalty, and being a reliable group member (Schwartz et al.,
2012)—was associated with acceptance of acts of collective cheat-
ing, but not with acceptance of acts of individual cheating.
Benevolence-caring did not interact in the same way with power
values to predict collective cheating acceptance. It would thus
seem that, from an intrapersonal point of view too, in-group
Table 5
Study 3 (N  321): Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations Among Variables
Variables M SD Range (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benevolence dependability values (1) 5.31 .70 2.33–6.00 .57 .01 .03 .08 .07
Benevolence caring values (2) 5.40 .65 3.00–6.33 — .15 .03 .04 .10
Power dominance values (3) 2.90 1.13 1.00–6.00 — — .47 .06 .12
Power resources values (4) 2.64 1.18 1.00–5.67 — — — .02 .06
Acceptance of collective cheating (5) 5.29 1.08 1.00–7.00 — — — — .36
Acceptance of individual cheating (6) 2.65 1.13 1.00–7.00 — — — — —
 p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
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774 PULFREY, DURUSSEL, AND BUTERA
loyalty combined specifically with the desire to gain power is a
predictor of more accepting attitudes toward collective cheating.
We have seen that in-group loyalty values of benevolence
predict positive attitudes toward collective, not individual cheat-
ing, within competitive contexts and that, in combination with
power value adherence reveal a general trait-level acceptance of
collective cheating. There is considerable literature that demon-
strates reliable links between attitudes toward individual cheating
and cheating behavior (Jordan, 2001; Whitley, 1998), and in this
respect the results of the above three studies provide an important
contribution to the literature on cheating.
Study 4
In our fourth and final study, we had three key objectives: to
operationalize in-group loyalty as opposed to measuring it via the
adherence to benevolence values, to relate it to cheating behavior.
Operationalizing in-group loyalty is a valuable addition to this
suite of studies as it allows us to establish causality and overcome
the limitation of a self-report measure. To do this we combined
two ways of creating in-group loyalty: existing member familiarity
and the active generation of perceptions of similarity (a “birds of
a feather flock together” effect). In-group loyalty and benevolence
values revolve around enhancing the wellbeing of in-group mem-
bers, including the self (Schwartz et al., 2012). Harmonious group
functioning and the individual need for acceptance or relatedness
are underlying objectives (Schwartz, 2006). Both familiarity with
other group members and perceptions of other group members as
similar to the self should trigger greater feelings of loyalty toward
others in the group than a context in which group members are
strangers and perceive themselves as different from the other
group members. We care more about those who are close and like
us than those who are strangers and different from us. Thus, we
operationalized in-group loyalty by means of groups in which
group members knew each other and perceived that they had
things in common. This is particularly relevant to the educational
context as when group work is set up, often students are allowed
a free choice of group members, which usually produces a large
number of friendship groups or at least groups of individuals who
have something in common with each other.
Our second key objective was to test the impact of in-group
loyalty on actual cheating behavior. It is one thing to self-report
attitudes to cheating in an anonymous, individual survey, but quite
another to actually engage in cheating in the presence of someone
else. Consequently, measuring collective cheating in this way
constitutes a significant addition to the contribution provided by
this article.
In Studies 1 and 2, we worked with in-group loyalty via mea-
sured adherence to benevolence values in contexts that were com-
petitive. In Study 3 we measured adherence to both benevolence
and power values. An additional objective in Study 4 was therefore
to confirm and extend the results of Study 3 by again measuring
adherence to individual values of power.
Summing up, we hypothesized a positive interaction between
familiarity and participant adherence to power values, such that
adherence to power among familiar dyads would positively predict
collective cheating to a greater extent than among stranger dyads.
Method
Participants. Ninety students in the social sciences faculty of
a French-speaking Swiss university, with a mean age of 23.81
(SD 3.93), participated in this study. This sample consisted of 42
male and 48 female students. Participation was voluntary and all
students present participated.
Procedure. The experiment was carried out in the context of
three different non-first-year university classes all within the Fac-
ulty of Social Sciences (bachelor level: sports pedagogy (N  22)
and sociology (N  42); masters level: sports tourism (N  26)).
In-group familiarity was treated as an experimental condition. In
each class students were first asked to organize themselves into
dyads, either with someone they knew reasonably well (familiar
condition, N  48) or with someone they did not know (stranger
condition, N  42). This produced in total 21 dyads who did not
know each other and 24 who did. Once organized into their groups,
students filled in a questionnaire measuring their individual values.
Following this, they carried out a short task the aim of which was
to reinforce the salience of in-group identification—that is, close-
ness and social identity in the familiar condition and separateness
and individual identity in the stranger condition. Participants were
asked to communicate during two minutes between them in order
to produce, in the familiar condition, a list of five things they had
in common, and, in the stranger condition, a list of five ways in
which they were different from each other. Following this, stu-
dents were informed that they were to carry out a spatial reasoning
exercise in which they would attempt to reproduce six geometric
figures without lifting their pencil off the page and retracing any
one line more than once within a fixed time limit (Pulfrey &
Butera, 2013). The principle behind solving these exercises is a
fundamental principle in math developed by Leonhard Euler in
1736 and applied in the Seven Bridges of Könisberg problem. For
each question participants had a practice space and then a space in
which to draw the figure if they had succeeded in working out how
to produce it respecting the constraints. Dyads were asked to work
as a team. The exercise was presented as a class competition and
students were informed that the results would be published in
class, to mimic the competitive atmosphere typical of exams in
which students are likely to cheat (Pulfrey & Butera, 2013).
Participants were given 8 min to complete the six exercises and
then were asked to fill in a form per group affirming whether they
had succeeded in reproducing the figure or not. As three of the
figures, while ostensibly no more difficult than the others, could
not be drawn without lifting their pencil off the page, it was
possible to detect groups who cheated.
Data analysis procedure. We carried out analyses in two
stages. First, we tested the impact of the experimental manipula-
tion of familiarity on the measure of benevolence. This constituted
a sort of individual-level manipulation check. We expected that in
the familiar condition individuals’ adherence to benevolent in-
group loyalty would be higher than in the stranger condition as
individuals had self-selected in dyads with someone they knew and
a sense of in-group cohesion had been primed by the finding points
in common exercise. In our first set of analyses, we regressed
individual adherence to benevolence values on the familiarity
versus nonfamiliarity condition. As students came from different
classes, we included class as a control variable and also gender, as
research has shown that women have a relatively higher concern
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775GOOD CHEAT
and responsibility for others’ well-being than men (Beutel &
Marini, 1995) and preliminary analyses revealed a gender differ-
ence in adherence to benevolence values in the sample with
females valuing benevolence more than males, B  0.29, F(1,
89)  5.11, p  .03, 2  .05. As students had been grouped into
dyads, we controlled for group-level effects by using the Mundlak
fixed effects procedure and entering dyad as a dummy variable
(Mundlak, 1978). This gave us four terms in the equation: exper-
imental condition, gender, class, and dyad.
Second, we tested the impact of the interaction between the
experimental manipulation and adherence to power values on
cheating. We used a relative measure of power, as this is argued to
have the potential to interact with contextual variables in the
prediction of behavior as well as attitudes (Schwartz, 2006). As
gender composition of groups has been associated with intragroup
relations (Randel, 2002), we controlled for the gender composition
of the dyads with orthogonal contrasts. The first contrast grouped
the all-girls (N  36) and mixed dyads (N  28) both coded 1
in comparison with the all-male groups (N  26) coded 2. The
second contrast compared the two types of groups with girls
(mixed coded 1 and all girls coded 1). We also controlled for the
class they were in, creating two orthogonal contrasts. The first
contrast grouped the two bachelor classes together coded 1 in
comparison with the masters class coded 2, and the second contrast
compared the two bachelor classes (sociology coded1 and sports
pedagogy coded 1). The model thus included the experimental
condition familiarity versus nonfamiliarity, dyad mean power ad-
herence, the interaction between the two, and the gender and class
contrasts as control variables, making seven terms in total. We
carried out regression analyses using a Poisson regression with the
number of times the dyad cheated as the dependent variable
(Pulfrey & Butera, 2013).
Measures.
Values. For time reasons, the short version SSVS-4 (Beierlein,
Davidov, Cieciuch, Rammstedt, & Schwartz, 2014) of the French
version of the refined values survey was used. This version in-
cluded a three-item scale of benevolence (“It is important to
him/her to be a dependable and trustworthy friend” [benevolence-
dependability]; “It is important to him/her to help the people dear
to him/her” [benevolence-caring]; and “It is important to him/her
that all his friends and family can rely on him completely” [be-
nevolence-dependability];   .73). This was modified from the
SSVS-4 in order to include two benevolence-dependability items
rather than uniquely two benevolence-caring items, as in the con-
text of academic collusion the benevolence-dependability con-
struct appeared to be more relevant (cf. Study 3). This version also
included a two-item scale of power (“It is important to him/her to
be the one who tells others what to do;” “It is important to him/her
to be rich;”   .69). Participants indicated on a scale going from
1 (not at all like me) to 7 (very much like me) the degree to which
they felt they were like the person described in the question. A
principal component analysis carried out with just the benevolence
and power items confirmed the presence of two separate factors,
explaining 71.67% of total variance and with loadings of each item
on their respective factor no lower than .8. We calculated a mean
score per dyad of power value adherence using the Stata xtset
command. Then, in order to create the relative power value score
for the interaction, we calculated the mean dyad value score (all 10
values) and subtracted this from the raw dyad power score. We did
not have problems with outliers or abnormal distributions. De-
scriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.
Collective cheating behavior. We adapted the measure of
cheating behavior developed by Pulfrey and Butera (2013) as the
outcome of a collective behavior. In order to qualify as cheaters,
the dyad had to have filled in the answer space reserved for
successfully resolved puzzles and affirmed that they had solved
the puzzle, in at least one puzzle out of the three impossible ones.
Results
Results of the first regression analysis revealed a positive effect
of familiarity on participant adherence to benevolence values, B 
1.06, F(1, 86) 12.18, p .001, 2 .10, with participants in the
familiarity condition valuing benevolence more than those in the
nonfamiliarity condition. We also tested the same model on indi-
vidual adherence to power values and found no significant effects.
No other significant effects appeared except for the dummy group-
level variable, which corresponds to group membership (see Fig-
ure 3).
Our second set of analyses focused on cheating behavior. De-
scriptive analyses revealed that overall seven dyads cheated
(15.56%). In the familiar condition six dyads cheated (25%), while
only one dyad (4.76%) cheated in the stranger condition. The
regression analysis tested the impact of the interaction between the
familiarity variable and relative adherence to power values on
collective cheating. Results revealed-a positive main effect of
familiarity on cheating, B  19.09, SE  1.17, z  16.27, p 
.001, 2 .31, 95% CI [16.79, 21.39], showing that familiar dyads
cheated more than stranger dyads. There was also a main effect of
group-level power on collective cheating, B  15.84, SE  1.07,
z  14.77, p  .001, 2  .30, 95% CI [13.74, 17.94], and there
was a positive effect of the predicted interaction between famil-
iarity and adherence to power values, B  18.00, SE  1.22,
z14.73, p .001, 2 .18, 95% CI [20.36,15.57]. There
was also a main effect of gender, B  1.14, SE  0.35, z  3.32,
p  .001, 2  .09, 95% CI [0.47, 1.82] with all male groups
cheating more than all female or mixed.
Table 6
Study 4 (N  90): Descriptive Statistics
Variables M SD Range (2) (3)
Individual benevolence values (1) 6.43 .63 4.33–7.00 .16 .35
Individual power values (2) 3.96 1.27 1.00–6.50 — .74
Group-level relative power values (3) 1.45 .96 3.13–.83 — —
 p  .001.
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Analysis of simple effects, run with a linear regression model
because of lack of convergence of the Poisson model in the
stranger condition, showed that, while adherence to power values
did not significantly predict collective cheating in the stranger
condition, B  0.22, F(1, 38)  1.66, ns, it positively predicted
collective cheating in the familiar condition, B  0.73, F(1, 38) 
30.69, p  .001, 2  .49, 95% CI [0.45, 0.1.01]. Results are
presented in Figure 4.
Once again, because Study 4 has a relatively small sample size
with respect to the model complexity (i.e., k predictors), we went
through another robustness check in order to verify that the inter-
action effect was not simply due to chance by running two more
Monte-Carlo simulations. We used exactly the same process as in
Study 2.
Results revealed that whereas the interaction of relative dyad
adherence to power values and dyad familiarity in the random
model had no more than a 5% chance of producing a significant
effect on the dependent variable, in the actual model, the interac-
tion of these two variables showed a 97% probability of signifi-
cance These results indicate that this is likely to be a robust effect
despite the small sample size.
Discussion
In Study 4 we see first that, within a class context, students in
work groups who know each other and for whom the points group
members have in common are made salient, do attach more im-
portance to individual values of benevolence than those in work
groups with strangers with whom differences are accentuated. This
first finding confirms the relevance of the experimental manipu-
lation and shows that a context-specific priming of state-value
adherence can be achieved. Second, we find that within an aca-
demic context in which competition is salient, familiarity between
group members encourages collective cheating behavior, when
compared with groups composed of strangers. We also see that
relative adherence to power values predicts collective cheating
among dyad members who know each other but not among dyad
members who are not familiar with each other. This confirms the
results of Study 3 with actual behavior in interacting dyads.
Additionally, we see again a gender effect, with groups with male
students cheating more than female students.
General Discussion
The aim of this research has been to step outside the vast arena
of research on individual cheating and learn more about the rela-
tively unexplored territory of collective cheating, that is to say
academic dishonesty carried out with the collusion of the in-group.
We hypothesized that when competition is salient in one form or
another, relative prioritization of benevolence values with their
focus on in-group loyalty will positively predict more positive
attitudes toward collective forms of cheating than individual cheat-
ing. Four studies provided a range of support for this hypothesis
using variety of diverse methods. This is a powerful argument for
the core validity of the basic finding and avoids the risk of creating
one unique methodological approach, which, if invalidated, poten-
tially renders many follow-up studies also invalid (see Sturm &
Antonakis, 2015 for an example with power priming).
Results of Study 1 revealed that relative adherence to benevo-
lence values positively predicted acceptance of acts of collective
cheating, in a condition in which participants were presented with
a vision of society as fundamentally competitive in nature, whereas
in a condition portraying society as cooperative and in the control
condition, no significant effects were observed. These effects did
not emerge for individual cheating. The fact that benevolence
value adherence predicted acts of collective cheating and did not
predict acts of individual cheating also indicates external discrim-
inant validity in the collective cheating and individual cheating
scales. In addition, neighboring universalism values, characterized
by their focus on universal as opposed to in-group well-being, did
not predict collective cheating either as a main effect or in inter-
action with perceived societal competition, a finding that rein-
forces the validity of the demarcation between these two types of
self-transcendence values.
Results of Study 2 indicated that, within the resolutely compet-
itive context of an end-of-year selective examination, relative
adherence to benevolence values predicted greater degrees of
Figure 3. Study 3: Interaction between adherence to benevolence-
dependability values and adherence to power-dominance values.
Figure 4. Study 4: Interaction between adherence to power values and
experimental condition: dyad partners who know each other (familiar)
versus dyad partners who do not know each other (stranger).
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
777GOOD CHEAT
moral disengagement toward acts of collective than individual
cheating as described in vignettes. This reinforces the findings of
Study 1 by showing that, when holding competition constant,
relative adherence to benevolence values is specifically related to
collective as opposed to individual cheating.
Study 3, as well as introducing the value type nuances of the
recent refined model of individual values, examined the general
hypothesis from the more intrapersonal angle of adherence to
benevolence values in combination with adherence to power val-
ues. This allowed us to examine the relation between in-group
loyalty and chronic, ongoing perceptions of a competitive envi-
ronment, as the adoption of power values is underlain by the
implicit perception of the social environment as one in which
competition is present. Study 3 results indicated that simultaneous
adherence to benevolence-dependability, in other words in-group
loyalty values, and power values significantly predicted accep-
tance of collective cheating but not individual cheating. The use of
Schwartz et al.’s (2012) refined scale of individual values makes it
possible to fine-tune the precise character of the elements that
contribute to predict collective cheating in the context of academic
cheating. Results indicated that the more practical group contribu-
tion that issues from being a dependable, trustworthy group mem-
ber was more pertinent than the more emotive devotional aspect of
benevolence-caring.
Finally, in Study 4, we examined the role of familiarity with
group partners, which, as we observed, renders benevolence values
more contextually salient, in cheating behavior. As predicted, we
found that familiarity encouraged collective cheating, and that this
effect was accentuated by the degree to which team members were
power-hungry. These results reinforce the work on in-group fa-
voritism of Tajfel and Turner (1986) as well as Brewer (1999),
showing that in-group familiarity is indeed related to the valuing of
loyalty and also to resolutely unethical behaviors.
Contribution and Integration With Other Theories
All in all, we hope to provide a new and valuable insight into
academic cheating. First, we distinguish between cheating in its
individual and collective forms, aiming to contribute to define
what constitutes collective cheating; second, we provide potential
understanding of some reasons for its occurrence, introducing the
role of individual values in interaction with social context.
A first and very important contribution of this work is to
distinguish between individual and collective cheating. Research
on group forms of unethical behavior is still in its infancy (see
Weisel & Shalvi, 2015) and, to our knowledge, very little research
has focused on the distinction between individual and collective
cheating, despite the fact that it is central to understanding the
upstream motivational drives that encourage individuals and
groups to cheat. While cheating research has traditionally focused
on the individuals who cheat for their own individual gain (Mc-
Cabe & Treviño, 1997; Whitley, 1998), collective cheating for
shared gain is a reality even in relatively individualistic contexts,
as the Harvard example (Perez-Pena, 2013) shows. Anecdotal
evidence implies that the same applies, not surprisingly, to collec-
tive cultural contexts (Lewicka, November, 2014. Personal com-
munication.).
Furthermore, collective cheating is interesting not only because
it is current practice in a range of cultural contexts, but also
because of its much more dubious moral status, compared with the
much more clear-cut, universally condemned nature of individual
cheating. Both evolutionary theory (Boehm, 2012; Wilson, 2012;
Sloan Wilson, 2002) and moral foundations theory (Haidt, 2012)
affirm that in-group loyalty, as manifested in supporting the well-
being of one’s key group, which will in turn support one’s own
wellbeing, can indeed be considered a form of moral behavior.
This potential to consider in-group loyalty as moral and potentially
more moral than other types of morality is highly significant as it
allows us to understand how it can become possible for people to
fully rationalize and morally sanction via in-group loyalty, behav-
ior that is fundamentally unethical from another, that is to say
fairness and/or care.
A second contribution of this research is to understand why
collective cheating may occur, introducing individual values and
their relation with the social context as potential predictors of
collective cheating. This is important firstly as individual values
are argued to be a result of socialization and constitute the higher-
order life goals (Schwartz, 1992) that are directly associated with
students’ achievement goals as well as motivation for studying
(Pulfrey & Butera, 2013). As such, research relating individual
values to cheating carries on the longstanding tradition of research
on student motivation and cheating (Anderman et al., 1998; An-
derman & Danner, 2008; Anderman & Murdock, 2007; Murdock
et al., 2001, 2004). Second, the role of social context, particularly
that of a competitive, performance-oriented environment, also
builds on a solid body of educational research linking competitive
contexts to cheating (Anderman & Midgley, 2004; Murdock et al.,
2004). Third, the emphasis on the interaction between the individ-
ual factors and the social context also furthers the development of
a well-established lineage of educational research, in which indi-
vidual traits such as work ethic, goal-orientation, or motivation
interact with an aspect of the environment to produce cheating
(Corcoran & Hankey, 1989; Eisenberger & Shank, 1985).
From an applied perspective, this work also constitutes a useful
contribution as benevolence, with its widespread status as a highly
moral value, is promoted widely both in the media (see e.g.,
Keiningham & Aksoy, 2009) and in socialization practices
(Schwartz & Butenko, 2014). In itself, this is well and fine.
However, the promotion of benevolence values within a social or
societal context that simultaneously promotes values of competi-
tion and self-enhancement may indeed produce the unintended and
deleterious consequences of pro ingroup collective cheating. In
college life, an example of this may be found in the higher
incidence of cheating reported within fraternity and sorority asso-
ciations (McCabe & Bowers, 2009).
The present results also encourage us to reconsider the impli-
cations of work such as that of McCabe and Treviño (1993), who
showed that creating an Honor Code, which involves responsibility
to the institution as whole, reduces in-house cheating. However,
while that research was only concerned with individual cheating,
the present research raises the sticky question of whether an honor
code that heavily emphasized institutional loyalty could conceiv-
ably encourage pro-institution collective cheating in interinstitu-
tional contexts. In-group loyalty and high-stakes interinstitutional
competition might even explain cases of teacher cheating to help
students succeed in national exams (Espinoza, 2015).
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Limitations
However, and here we move on to the first limitation of this set
of studies. Much work remains to be done to develop further ways
of examining collective cheating. These could take into account
the differences between collective versus individual cheating in
course work versus exams, the relative degree of seriousness of the
offense and the role of altruistic cheating within the collective
cheating framework. In addition, although we would argue for the
robustness of the general effect, having assessed it in four different
ways, using three types of experimental approach and three dif-
ferent dependent variables, more work into boundary conditions,
such as gender and collective cheaters’ perceptions of competition
is required. A further useful development will be to examine the
impact of student adherence to other values such as conformity
versus self-direction on collective cheating behavior, as well as the
interaction between different value types.
The adaptation of Shu et al.’s (2011) measure of moral disen-
gagement in Study 2 and the use of a CFA with a small sample size
could also be considered as methodological limitations, although
Wolf, Harrington, Clark, and Miller (2013) showed evidence that
a one latent factor model with six indicators and loadings of .65
only requires a sample of 60 to be valid (see also Bastardoz &
Antonakis, 2014, 2016). However, as a balance to these statistical
concerns, the consistency of the results across four studies using
different methods strengthens confidence in the findings.
A third and associated limitation comes in the small sample size
in Studies 2 and 4. Using Monte-Carlo simulation techniques has
enabled us to have a good degree of confidence as to the robust-
ness of the effects reported, despite small sample size. However,
this limitation sends out a clarion call for replication with larger,
diverse samples. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this limita-
tion emerges from the necessity, we believe, of carrying out
academic cheating-related surveys and experimental work as much
as possible within the ecologically sound environment of the
classroom. While experimental work on cheating in laboratories
expunges results of real-life error and variance, it also removes
many of the contextual cues, triggers and stakes that can kick in to
motivate in situ academic cheating. Research on collective cheat-
ing and the contexts which encourage it can also be enriched is by
extending our understanding of the types of competition that
trigger the benevolence-collective cheating phenomenon. We have
found the effect with representations of macrosocietal competition
as well as internalized competition in the form of adherence to
power-dominance values.
However, future research should find out more about the in-
group loyalty effect within different institutional contexts, such as
team-work within competitive classrooms and organizations,
multi-unit businesses that set up competition between branches,
inter-organizational competition within a highly competitive sector
such as finance and banking. More precise questions could address
the impact of the way in which competition is structured on
collective cheating. For example, would benevolence values still
predict collective cheating within the context of a one-winner-
take-all competitive environment such as an award, or in the
context of a strict numerus clausus, such as entry to Ivy League
universities (see Pope, 2003)? In addition, future research could
fruitfully examine whether content areas, prior achievement levels,
classroom goal structures, gender composition of groups and grade
levels impact collective cheating and how. For example, applying
Anderman and Midgley’s (2004) analysis of classroom goals and
cheating in middle and high school specifically to collective cheat-
ing would provide valuable information on both age and classroom
context and interactions between the two.
A further limitation of Studies 1–3 is the relatively low reliabil-
ity of the measures of benevolence values. While it is beyond the
scope of this article to investigate in depth the reasons for this, the
relatively central space within the circumplex model of individual
values that benevolence values consistently occupy (Schwartz &
Butenko, 2014) indicates that whatever other values people adhere
to, benevolence values will hold a relatively important place in
their overall values scheme. Support for family and friends is a
human universal that will feature to a certain extent even in
relatively individualistic contexts (Schwartz, 2007b) and is mor-
ally valued (Schwartz, 2007a). As such it is in line with our
presentation of benevolence values as conceptually close to the
universally approved in-group loyalty. One potential consequence
of this phenomenon, however, is the potential for large amounts of
noise or error within the measurement of benevolence as people
may adhere to it for different reasons and social desirability bias
may be present.
Finally, it would be of significant interest to extend this work
with greater precision in the definition of the in-group. We have
worked primarily with the familiar in-group that is salient in
school and university. However, nationality or ethnic loyalties
among students, particularly minority students and students in an
international setting, as well as the family constitute other highly
salient in-groups for students. Exploring collective cheating in
these domains could not only refine our knowledge of the what and
why of collective cheating, but also bring in additional issues such
as time-lags in cheating-related reciprocal altruism as well as the
potential impact of cross-cutting group identities.
Conclusion
Benevolence values are central values to human existence and
adhered to worldwide, whether in relatively individualistic or
collectivist cultures (Schwartz, 2007b) and loyalty to close ones is
routinely promoted as the most important form of morality
(Willsher, 2012). Group work with friends is encouraged in many
academic settings. Parallel to this, while teachers may not explic-
itly encourage competition within their classes, the school and
university environment is by no means free from the pressures of
competition, explicit as in trophies, prizes, awards, or preparation
for college or job applications, or implicit as in societal pressure to
“do well” or already internalized values of power, influence,
wealth, and public image. As cheating expert Donald McCabe says
“I don’t think there’s any question that students have become more
competitive, under more pressure, and, as a result, tend to excuse
more from themselves and other students, and that’s abetted by
the adults around them” (Pérez-Pena, 2012b, p. 1). To quote one of
the high-achieving high school students in Pope’s (2003, p. 32)
study: “To get into an Ivy. That’s all I can think about . . . to get
in and become a successful $500,000-a-year doctor or engineer or
whatever it is I want to be. . . . I have to get accepted.” Students
who value benevolence may thus be torn between the imperative
of success and loyalty to their friends and one neat way around this
form of dissonance may indeed be engagement in collective cheat-
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779GOOD CHEAT
ing, where the unethical aspect of cheating is seen through the
muddied lens of helping friends as well as themselves.
This situation is exacerbated by the cloud of moral ambiguity of
which seems to surround collaboration in many students’ minds
about how much is tolerated and when (Chapman & Monahan,
2012; Finder, 2007). Harvard has recently introduced a paragraph
on collective cheating in its handbook for students (Harvard Uni-
versity FAS Student Handbook, 2017) and as, Pérez-Peña (2014,
p. 4) affirms “schools need to talk much more about honesty,
because students’ grasp of what constitutes cheating is weak.” This
highlights the critical importance of understanding more about
how adherence to such well-accepted moral values as in-group
loyal support can, in certain conditions, lead to justifying unethical
behavior. Research has to date prioritized investigation of individ-
ual cheating in academic settings. Now is the time to expand our
horizons and understand more about how students cheat together.
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Appendix A
Study 1 - Experimental Condition Vignettes
In the self-enhancement society condition, students read the
following text:
Competitive Market
The society your studies are preparing you for is a market, which
functions through competition. Economic efficiency and consumption
are central—your wellbeing is enhanced by having things. The accu-
mulation of material wealth, status, and consequently power is a
worthy objective. You need to think about your individual needs and
how to gain a competitive advantage in life. You are free to choose
what you buy and to decide what you want to achieve in your life. For
companies, financial accountability and technical rationality are par-
amount: Profit is the goal and the end justifies the means. Prioritizing
corporate interests helps society as the wealth trickles down to create
a healthy economy. Human resources are valued and rewarded to the
extent that they advance company interests. As Charles Darwin said
“In the struggle for survival, the fittest win out at the expense of their
rivals.”
In the self-transcendence society condition participants were
given the same instructions and read the following text:
Cooperative Community
The society your studies are preparing you for is a community, which
functions through cooperation. Nonfinancial, human outcomes are
central—your wellbeing is enhanced by self-actualization—and the
generation of human happiness and life satisfaction, altruism, and
transcendence is a worthy objective. You need to balance individual
and community needs across generations, invest in the future and
focus on living life with meaning. For companies, physical, social
well-being, quality of life, and the well-being of the broader society
are paramount; the betterment of people, society, and the ecological
system is the goal and how you act at work counts as much as the
outcome. Business is there for the good of all involved, but also to
serve humanity and advance the interests of all humankind. As Martin
Luther King said “We may have all come on different ships, but we’re
in the same boat now.”
Appendix B
Study 2 - Experimental Condition Vignettes
Individual cheating—copying: “I’m studying at the University
of XXX. At the end of my first year, I had to take an exam that
would determine whether I got into the second year or not. All the
students were seated relatively close to each other. During the test,
I was therefore able to see the answers of the person in front of me.
That helped me to pass the exam and get into the second year.”
Collective cheating—helping in-group: “I’m studying at the
University of XXX. At the end of my first year, our first year, my
three best friends and I had to take an exam that would determine
whether we got into the second year or not. All the students were
seated relatively close to each other. During the test, I was there-
fore able to show my paper to my friends and share my answers
with them. That helped them to pass the exam and get into the
second year.”
Collective cheating—copying off others: “I’m studying at the
University of XXX. At the end of our first year, my three best
friends and I had to take an exam that would determine whether we
got into the second year or not. All the students were seated
relatively close to each other. During the test, we were therefore
able to see the answers of the people in front of us. That helped us
to pass the exam and get into the second year.”
Collective cheating—copying of each other (sharing answers):
“I’m studying at the University of XXX. At the end of our first
year, my three best friends and I had to take an exam that would
determine whether we got into the second year or not. All the
students were seated relatively close to each other. During the test,
we were therefore able to share our answers. That helped us to pass
the exam and get into the second year.”
Appendix C
Study 2 - Experimental Condition 1 Vignette in French
The French version of the first vignette is as follows: Ci-
dessous, vous trouverez l’extrait du témoignage d=Alex, qui étudie
dans cette université. Merci d=en prendre connaissance.« Je fais
mes études a` l’université de XXX. A la fin de ma première année,
j’ai subi un examen déterminant pour ma promotion en deuxième
année. Tous les étudiants étaient assis relativement proche les uns
des autres. Durant l’épreuve, j’ai donc pu voir les réponses de la
personne assise devant moi. Cela m=a aidé a` réussir l’examen et a`
passer en deuxième année ».
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